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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Third Judicial District Court, Judge J. Dennis Fredrick, entered its final 
judgment in this matter on or about February 15, 2005. Plaintiff-Appellant timely filed 
her Notice of Appeal on or about March 15, 2005. The Utah Supreme Court transferred 
this matter to this Court on or about March 21, 2005. Therefore, the Utah Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction over this Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
FIRST ISSUE PRESENTED 
Under Utah law, is the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action required to present 
expert medical testimony when the malpractice arose from the defendant-physician's 
failure to remove a foreign object from the plaintiffs surgical site? 
Standard of Review 
This issue presents a question of law. The trial court's conclusions of law should 
be reviewed by this Court de novo. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). Further, to 
insure that a court acted within its discretion, the facts and reasons for the court's 
decisions must fully set forth appropriate findings and conclusions. Barnes v. Barnes, 857 
P.2d 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Findings must be sufficiently detailed to ensure that the 
trial court's discretionary determination was rationally based. Id. 
Preservation of this Issue 
Plaintiff-Appellant preserved this issue below by filing her Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 127-154). 
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SECOND ISSUE PRESENTED 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, does Rule 26(a)(3) require the plaintiff 
to a medical malpractice action to identify and designate treating physicians as expert 
witnesses when such treating physicians were previously identified and designated in the 
plaintiffs Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures and when the treating physicians were not 
"retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case"? 
Standard of Review 
This issue presents a question of law. The trial court's conclusions of law should 
be reviewed by this Court de novo. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). Further, to 
insure that a court acted within its discretion, the facts and reasons for the court's 
decisions must fully set forth appropriate findings and conclusions. Barnes v. Barnes, 857 
P.2d 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Findings must be sufficiently detailed to ensure that the 
trial court's discretionary determination was rationally based. Id. 
Preservation of this Issue 
Plaintiff-Appellant preserved this issue below by filing her Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 127-154). 
THIRD ISSUE PRESENTED 
Under Utah law, does a district court abuse its discretion when it denies a 
plaintiffs motion for trial by jury, pursuant to Rule 39, when the plaintiff makes its 
motion before any discovery has commenced? 
// 
// 
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Standard of Review 
A trial court's refusal to grant or to deny a jury trial pursuant to Rule 39(b) is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. James Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 390 P.2d 127, 128 (Utah 
1964); Aspenwood, LLC v. C.A.T., LLC, 2003 UT App 28, Tf 33, 73 P.3d 947, 954. 
Preservation of this Issue 
Plaintiff-Appellant preserved this issue below by filing her Motion for Jury Trial 
and her Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof. (R. 36-41). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Rule 26(a)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reads as follows: 
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony. 
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any 
person who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, 
or 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the 
court, this disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or 
specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties 
as an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be 
accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness or 
party. The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is 
expected to testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to which the 
expert is expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for each opinion; 
the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored 
by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid 
for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the 
witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the 
preceding four years. 
(a)(3)(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the 
court, the disclosures required by Subdivision (a)(3) shall be made within 
30 days after the expiration of fact discovery as provided by Subdivision 
(d) or, if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on 
the same subject matter identified by another party under paragraph (3)(B), 
within 60 days after the disclosure made by the other party. 
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Rule 26 has been reproduced in its entirety as Exhibit A in the Addendum to Appellant's 
Brief, infra. 
Rule 39(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reads as follows: 
(b) By the court. Issues not demanded for trial by jury as provided in 
Rule 38 shall be tried by the court; but, notwithstanding the failure of a 
party to demand a jury in an action in which such a demand might have 
been made of right, the court in its discretion upon motion may order a trial 
by jury of any or all issues. 
Rule 39 has been reproduced in its entirety as Exhibit B in the Addendum to Appellant's 
Brief, infra. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff-Appellant June W. Cox Pete ("Mrs. Pete") respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the judgment granted in favor of Defendant Dr. Robert L. Youngblood 
("Defendant") in her claim for Defendant's medical malpractice and negligence. (R. 6-7). 
Mrs. Pete's claims stem from Defendant's failure to remove surgical gauze from Mrs. 
Pete's body. Id. The gauze remained in her body for approximately thirty years, causing 
persistent infections and discomfort. (R. 5-6). 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition of Court Below 
Mrs. Pete filed her Complaint on or about February 6, 2003, against Defendant 
and St. Mark's Hospital. (R. 3). Defendant answered the Complaint on or about April 7, 
2003, and Mrs. Pete voluntarily dismissed St. Mark's Hospital from the litigation on or 
// 
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about July 14, 2003 after receiving sufficient statutory authority negating the liability of 
St. Mark's Hospital. (R. 10, 26-27). 
Prior to the commencement of any discovery proceedings, but more than ten days 
after Defendant filed his answer, Mrs. Pete moved, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 39(b), for 
a trial by jury. (R. 36-37). Although Mrs. Pete fully intended to demand a jury trial 
within ten days of the last responsive pleading to be filed, pursuant to Rule 38, she was 
unable to do so because St. Mark's Hospital was dismissed from the suit before it filed a 
responsive pleading. (R. 39). On or about October 28, 2003, the district court denied Mrs. 
Pete's motion for a trial by jury as follows: 
[T]he [cjourt concludes that the Plaintiff waived her right to a jury trial by 
failing to file a timely demand in compliance with the provisions of Rule 
38, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate 
sufficient justification to persuade the Court to exercise its discretion 
pursuant to Rule 39(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to relieve her of that 
waiver. 
(R. 62-63). The district court did not, however, identify any way in which Defendant 
would be prejudiced, or any other strong or compelling reason to refuse to grant Mrs. 
Pete's motion for a trial by jury. 
During the discovery process, Mrs. Pete submitted her Initial Disclosures to 
Defendant. (R. 60-61). Although Defendant never returned this favor, Mrs. Pete provided 
all of the information required by Rule 26(a). See Initial Disclosures, attached as Exhibit 
G and incorporated herein by this reference. In her initial disclosures to Defendant, Mrs. 
Pete identified at least three doctors—two medical doctors and one dentist—who 
provided her with treatment and could offer testimony in this case. Id. Mrs. Pete also 
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provided medical records and billing summaries from these medical providers with her 
initial disclosures to Defendant. Unlike Mrs. Pete, Defendant never identified, prior to his 
motion for summary judgment, to Mrs. Pete any individual—including himself—who 
would offer any expert testimony on his behalf. 
After participating in discovery, and after the court-imposed deadline for filing 
dispositive motions, Defendant moved for summary judgment, alleging only that Mrs. 
Pete failed to designate an expert witness. (R. 103, 110-11). Mrs. Pete opposed 
Defendant's motion, making the following four arguments: (1) Defendant failed to file 
his motion before the deadline set by the district court for filing dispositive motions in 
this case; (2) Mrs. Pete properly designated her expert witnesses and provided her expert 
witness' reports in her Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures; (3) expert testimony is not required 
in the case at hand because it is within the common knowledge and experience of 
laypeople that negligence and medical malpractice has occurred where physicians leave 
surgical instruments and paraphernalia inside surgical sites; and (4) a plaintiff is not 
required to designate her treating physicians as expert witnesses because they are not 
specifically retained or employed for the purpose of providing expert testimony. (R. 127, 
131-35). However, the district court refused to strike the affidavit of Defendant, in which 
he offered expert testimony despite never identifying himself as an expert witness 
pursuant to Rule 26(a)(3); the district court struck the affidavit of Mrs. Pete's treating 
physician, which was filed in opposition to Defendant's motion, stating that the affidavit 
"was not submitted until after the Plaintiff certified this case for trial"; and the district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant as follows: 
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[BJecause this case requires the presentation of expert testimony and none 
has been provided, summary judgment is appropriate. Finally, after 
reviewing the record in this matter, the Court is not persuaded the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur has any application. 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Motion to Strike are granted. 
(R. 228-29). 
Mrs. Pete timely filed her Notice of Appeal, and the Utah Supreme Court 
transferred the case to this Court, from which she seeks relief from the judgment of the 
district court below. 
C. Statement of Facts 
Mrs. Pete respectfully requests that this Court reverse the judgment and order of 
the district court below in which that court held (1) that the firmly established doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur has no application to this case, (2) that a plaintiffs treating physicians 
must be designated as expert witnesses, (3) that the identification of treating physicians as 
witnesses in a plaintiffs Initial Disclosures, and the provision of medical records and 
billing summaries from such treating physicians, does not adequately identify treating 
physicians as expert witnesses, and (4) that Mrs. Pete is not entitled to present her case to 
a jury of her peers. (R. 58-59, 62-63, 228-30, 238-40). 
The medical malpractice case at hand began at a horse race in 1970. The horse on 
which Mrs. Pete was riding suffered a "stroke," causing the large animal to fall. See 
Deposition of June W. Cox Pete at 20, attached as Exhibit H and incorporated herein by 
this reference. The horse threw Mrs. Pete face first to the ground. Id. As she lay there 
helplessly, the horse fell on top of Mrs. Pete, the "saddle horn and candle" hitting her 
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shoulder and her head. Id. She lay unconscious on the track for nearly an hour while 
emergency medical attention was sought. Id. The small Nevada town in which the race 
occurred was ill equipped to handle injuries as severe as those suffered by Mrs. Pete, so 
the doctor arranged for Mrs. Pete to be flown to Salt Lake City for treatment. Id. at 21. 
Mrs. Pete needed expert medical attention. 
At St. Mark's Hospital in Salt Lake City, Mrs. Pete was placed in the care of a 
young and inexperienced plastic surgeon—the Defendant. (R. 116). Defendant had only 
been admitted to practice medicine in Utah for six short months when he attempted to 
repair thejshattered bones in Mrs. Pete's face. (R. 113, 116). Defendant wired together as 
many bones as he could and then placed gauze in the surgical site to "provide stability." 
(R. 113). 
Approximately two weeks after the surgery, Mrs. Pete visited Defendant so that he 
could remove the gauze and sutures he had placed during the surgery. (R. 113); see also 
Exhibit H at 29-37. Mrs. Pete visited Defendant's office approximately three more times, 
where she was examined by the young surgeon. No additional gauze was removed from 
her facial tissue during these appointments. Exhibit H at 29-37; (R. 113). 
Over the next thirty years, Mrs. Pete suffered from persistent and painful sinus 
infections, swelling, and headaches. Id. 38-39. Although she is a hardy rancher who 
dislikes taking medication because she would rather know what is happening to her body 
than mask the pain, Mrs. Pete visited her family physician and properly took prescribed 
medications, hoping her malady could be corrected. Id. at 35, 38-39, 45-54. However, in 
November 2001, after a particularly painful and severe infection caused the area below 
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her eye to swell to the size of an egg, Mrs. Pete saw a specialist in St. George, Utah, for 
additional treatment and diagnosis. Id. at 45-47, 65-66. Unfortunately the specialist 
could not determine the cause of Mrs. Pete's chronic pain, swelling, and infections. Id. at 
49-50. 
Mrs. Pete's dentist examined her to determine whether her problems stemmed 
from her teeth. After finding only normal and healthy teeth, he lanced the infected portion 
of her cheek. Id. at 67-70. A large amount of foul-smelling puss oozed from the 
puncture. Id. Then, the dentist found the source of Mrs. Pete's chronic infections and 
swelling—thirty-year-old gauze buried under Mrs. Pete's facial tissue. Id. An oral 
surgeon removed two five-inch pieces of gauze from Mrs. Pete's facial tissue. Id. The 
gauze was located at the site of her original 1970 surgery, which was performed by 
Defendant. Id. at 55. Mrs. Pete had no other surgery around her face since Defendant 
placed gauze in her surgical site. Id. Following the removal of the purulent gauze, Mrs. 
Pete has had no recurring symptoms. Id. at 69-70. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This Court must decide whether a surgeon's negligence in failing to remove 
surgical paraphernalia from a patient's facial tissue "speaks for itself." In finding in favor 
of Defendant, the court below erred in three ways: First, it is within the common 
knowledge and experience of laypeople that a surgeon who leaves gauze in a surgical site 
for thirty years has been negligent. Therefore, the court erred in refusing to apply the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the case at hand. Second, even though no expert testimony 
is required to prove negligence under res ipsa loquitur, the district court erred in striking 
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the affidavits of Mrs. Pete's treating doctors. Finally, the court below should have granted 
Mrs. Pete's motion for jury trial because it would not have resulted in any prejudice. 
First, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the case at hand. In medical 
malpractice cases, a plaintiff may prove her prima facie case of negligence against a 
physician without providing any expert testimony if the physician's conduct is an 
"affront" to the medical profession, or if the elements of res ipsa loquitur are shown. 
Courts in this state, and in other jurisdictions, have held that when a surgeon leaves 
behind surgical paraphernalia inside a patient, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be 
applied because it is within the common knowledge and experience of laypeople that 
such a mistake would not happen but for negligence. In the case at hand, Defendant left 
surgical gauze in Mrs. Pete's facial tissue, causing thirty years' worth of pain, discomfort, 
and infection. Therefore, Defendant was entitled to proceed under a res ipsa loquitur 
theory, and the judgment and order of the district court must be reversed. 
Second, Mrs. Pete submitted expert testimony, even though not required under the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, to oppose Defendant's motion for summary judgment. The 
court erred in ruling that Mrs. Pete failed to properly designate her experts. Pursuant to 
Rule 26(a)(3), a party must identify the witnesses she intends to elicit expert opinions 
from and produce a report outlining the bases of the opinions. However, by its terms, the 
rule only applies to "a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert 
testimony in the case," not to treating physicians. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B). 
In the case at hand, the affidavits submitted by Mrs. Pete satisfied the 
requirements of Rule 26(a)(3) for two reasons: First, the affidavits were from treating 
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physicians, who are not subject to the strictures of Rule 26(a)(3). And second, Mrs. Pete 
properly identified her witnesses and provided their notes and records in her initial 
disclosures to Defendant. Therefore, the district court erred in striking the affidavits 
submitted by Mrs. Pete, and the judgment and order of that court must be reversed. 
Finally, the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant Mrs. Pete's 
motion for a jury trial. Although granting such motions lies with the discretion of the 
court, a motion for jury trial should be granted liberally, unless the opposing party shows 
prejudice or some other "strong and compelling" reason. 
In the case at hand, Defendant would have suffered no prejudice, and no other 
strong or compelling reason existed for denying Mrs. Pete's motion. At the time of her 
motion, no discovery had commenced as the litigation was still in its infancy. Further, 
Mrs. Pete's failure to demand a jury trial earlier did not result from inadvertence. 
Therefore, the court below erred by refusing to grant Mrs. Pete the opportunity to present 
her evidence of Defendant's negligence to a jury. 
For these reasons, this Court should hold that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
applies when a surgeon fails to remove surgical gauze from a patient's facial tissue, that 
Mrs. Pete properly submitted expert affidavits in opposition to Defendant's motion for 
summary judgment, and that Mrs. Pete is entitled to a trial by jury. Therefore, the 
judgment and order of the district court should be reversed, and this case should be 
remanded for trial. 
// 
// 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY REQUIRING MRS. PETE TO 
PRESENT EXPERT MEDICAL TESTIMONY BECAUSE IT IS 
WITHIN THE COMMON KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE OF 
LAYPEOPLE THAT A SURGEON HAS BEEN NEGLIGENT IF HE 
LEAVES A FOREIGN OBJECT IN A PATIENT. 
First, Mrs. Pete was improperly required to present expert medical testimony to 
show that Defendant breached the standard of care when he left surgical gauze in her 
operative site for thirty years. In order to prevail on a medical malpractice claim under 
Utah law, a plaintiff must generally prove four elements: "(1) the standard of care (duty), 
(2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages." Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1327 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Dalley v. Utah Valley Reg'I Med. Or., 791 P.2d 193, 195-
96 (Utah 1990); Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987)). However, "expert testimony is unnecessary to establish the standard of 
care owed the plaintiff where the propriety of the treatment received is within the 
common knowledge and experience of the layman." Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 
(Utah 1980). 
In holding that expert testimony was required in the case at hand, the district court 
erred because laypeople can understand that negligence has occurred when a surgeon 
forgets to remove gauze from within a patient's body. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
should be applied in such cases, allowing the "finder of fact [to] logically conclude that 
an injury was probably caused by negligence." Baczuk v. Salt Lake Reg 7 Med. Or., 2000 
UT App 225, If 6, 8 P.3d 1037, 1039 (citing King v. Searle Pharm., Inc., 832 P.2d 858, 
862 (Utah 1992)). 
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The application of this doctrine "allows a plaintiff to raise an inference of 
negligence through circumstantial evidence." Baczuk, 2000 UT App 225, f 6, 8 P.3d at 
1039 (citing Dalley, 791 P.2d at 196). To proceed under this doctrine, a plaintiff must 
generally establish three elements: 
(1) the accident was of a kind which, in the ordinary course of events, 
would not have happened had the defendant used due care; 
(2) the agency or instrumentality causing the accident was at the time of the 
accident under the exclusive management or control of the defendant; 
and 
(3) the plaintiffs own use or operation of the agency or instrumentality was 
not primarily responsible for the accident. 
Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1327 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting King, 832 P.2d at 
861; and citing Dalley, 791 P.2d at 196). A plaintiff in a medical malpractice action, 
however, is not required to provide this foundation where "the medical procedure is so 
common or the outcome so affronts our notions of medical propriety that expert 
testimony is not required to establish what would occur in the ordinary course of events." 
Baczuk, 2000 UT App 225, U 7, 8 P.3d at 1039-1040 (quoting Nixdorf, 612 P.2d at 353). 
Therefore, this Court should reverse the decision of the district court and remand this 
matter for trial if (1) the failure to remove gauze strips from a surgical site "affronts our 
notions of medical propriety," or (2) the three elements of res ipsa loquitur can be 
satisfied by Mrs. Pete. 
A. The Failure to Remove Gauze from a Surgical Site Is an Affront to 
Medical Propriety. 
First, Mrs. Pete is entitled to the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
because Defendant's conduct "affronts out notions of medical propriety." Id. The conduct 
13 
of a physician rises to such a level of impropriety when it is within the common 
experience and knowledge of a layperson that the injury suffered by the patient "more 
probably than not resulted from negligence." Id. f 8, 8 P.3d at 1040. Where a patient 
underwent surgery on his fingers and emerged from the surgery with pressure injuries or 
bums on his buttocks and nerve damage to his leg, this Court held that "medical 
expertise" was not required "to understand the steps that must be taken to avoid such 
injuries." Id. ^ 11. Therefore, the court held that the injured patient could properly rely on 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and reversed the judgment of the district court in favor of 
the negligent physician. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the application of res ipsa loquitur with 
respect to a surgeon who left gauze inside his patient in Fredrickson v. Maw, 227 P.2d 
772 (Utah 1951), overruled on other grounds by Swan v. Lamb, 584 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah 
1978). In that case, a surgeon "carelessly left gauze, dressings, threads, and sutures" 
inside the surgical site when performing a tonsillectomy. Id. at 772. After recognizing the 
"well-recognized rule holding that when facts may be ascertained by the ordinary use of 
the senses of lay witnesses, it is not necessary that expert testimony be produced and 
relied upon," the court noted that "actions involving negligence in leaving instruments, 
needles, sponges, bandages, gauze or foreign particles in incisions, wounds, or open 
cavities" fall into the no-expert-needed rule. Id. at 773. Specifically, the court noted that 
if "a surgeon should lose the instrument with which he operates in the incision which he 
makes in his patient, it would seem as a matter of common sense that scientific opinion 
// 
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could throw little light on the subject." Id, (quoting Wharton v. Warner, 135 P. 235, 237 
(Wash. 1913)). 
Further, where a surgeon lost a needle inside a patient's body while repairing the 
patient's rectocele, the court held that no expert testimony was required to prove the 
surgeon's negligence. Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980) ("[EJxpert 
testimony should not have been required to establish the professional standard of care 
under the facts of the present case."). Specifically, the court ruled that "expert testimony 
is unnecessary to establish the standard of care owed the plaintiff where the propriety of 
the treatment received is within the common knowledge and experience of the layman." 
Id. The court also noted that "[t]he loss of a surgical instrument or other paraphernalia, in 
the operating site, exemplifies [the] type of treatment" where no expert testimony was 
required. Id. 
In the case at hand, Defendant's conduct was an affront to medical propriety, and 
the court below, therefore, erred in refusing to consider Defendant's negligence under a 
res ipsa loquitur theory. Defendant left surgical paraphernalia inside Mrs. Pete's facial 
tissue after performing surgery on her. By common knowledge, experience, and plain 
common sense, laypeople generally know that where a surgeon forgets or fails to remove 
surgical paraphernalia from a surgical site, the surgeon has negligently failed to satisfy 
his standard of care. The district court failed to consider the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, 
and the judgment of the court below must be reversed. 
// 
// 
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B. Defendant's Negligence Speaks for Itself and Satisfies the Elements for 
the Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur. 
Second, even if Mrs. Pete is not entitled to the application of res ipsa loquitur 
because Defendant's conduct was an "affront" to medical propriety, the doctrine should 
be applied because each of its elements has been met. The assertion of a claim under the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur generally requires that the following three elements be 
shown: (1) that the injury would not have ordinarily occurred in the absence of 
negligence; (2) that the instrumentality causing the injury was under the exclusive control 
of the defendant; and (3) that the plaintiffs use of the instrumentality, if any, did not 
cause the injury. See, e.g., Robb, 863 P.2d at 1327; King, 832 P.2d at 861; Dalley, 791 
P.2d at 196. Because each of these elements has been satisfied in the case at hand, Mrs. 
Pete is entitled to proceed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
As was mentioned supra, Utah courts have consistently held that where a 
physician leaves surgical paraphernalia imbedded within their patients, such injured 
patients are entitled to proceed on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. See, e.g., Fredrickson, 
227 P.2d at 772 (holding the doctrine applicable where a surgeon failed to remove gauze 
from a surgical site); Nixdorf, 612 P.2d at 352 (holding that "[t]he loss of a surgical 
instrument or other paraphernalia, in the operating site, exemplifies [the] type of 
treatment" where no expert testimony was required"). 
In the case at hand, Defendant left surgical paraphernalia, in the form of surgical 
gauze, in the operative site in 1970, and Mrs. Pete suffered damages as the direct and 
proximate result. Utah law is clear that when a surgeon leaves behind a foreign object in 
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a surgical site, no expert testimony is necessary with regard to the standard of care. It is 
well within the common knowledge and experience of laypeople that a physician failing 
to remove gauze, or other surgical paraphernalia, from a surgical site, has breached the 
applicable standard of care. The Defendant had exclusive control over the gauze, and 
Mrs. Pete never had any other facial or mouth surgery during which gauze could have 
been left in her facial tissue. Exhibit H at 55. Finally, as Mrs. Pete was unconscious 
during the surgery in which Defendant placed the gauze in the surgical site, she can have 
no responsibility for Defendant's negligence. Therefore, the district court erred in 
requiring Mrs. Pete to produce expert testimony, and the judgment of the court below 
should be reversed. 
Courts in other American jurisdictions concur with this result. For instance, where 
a surgeon left a laparotomy sponge in a patient's body following her hysterectomy, the 
court applied res ipsa loquitur, holding that "[a] layman can understand, without expert 
testimony, that the unauthorized or unexplained leaving of an object inside a patient is 
negligence." Coleman v. Rice, 706 So. 2d 696, 698 (Miss. 1997). Further, where another 
doctor left a surgical sponge inside his patient, the court noted that "[t]he jury could infer 
negligence without any further showing, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, because 
the event complained of is clearly one which 'ordinarily would not happen in the absence 
of negligence.'" Burke v. Wash. Hosp. Or., 475 F.2d 364, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (quoting 
// 
// 
// 
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Raza v. Sullivan, 432 F.2d 617, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1970); and citing Quick v. Thurston, 290 
F.2d 360 (D.C. Cir. 1961)).1 
Finally, the district court erred in requiring Mrs. Pete to provide expert testimony 
regarding Defendant's negligence because expert testimony in the case at hand is 
probably improper under the Utah Rules of Evidence. Specifically, Rule 702 only allows 
"a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" 
to present testimonial evidence of her opinions "[i]f scientific, technical, or other 
1
 See also, e.g.,Dietze v. King, 184 F. Supp. 944, (E.D. Vir. 1960) (holding that, 
where a physician left a surgical sponge inside a patient, "[a] clearer case for the 
application of the doctrine [of res ipsa loquitur] in an action for medical malpractice 
cannot be shown"); Mitchell v. Baylor Univ. Med. Or., 109 S.W.3d 838, 841 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2003) ("Although res ipsa loquitur is generally inapplicable to malpractice cases, an 
exception is recognized when the nature of the alleged malpractice and injuries are 
plainly within the common knowledge of laymen, requiring no expert testimony, such as 
negligence in leaving surgical instruments or sponges within the body.") (citing Haddock 
v. Arnspiger, 793 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tex. 1990)); Tice v. Hall, 303 S.E.2d 832 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1983) (holding that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action was entitled to rely on 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to show that a surgeon, who failed to remove a surgical 
sponge from the patient's body, breached the applicable standard of care), affd 313 
S.E.2d 565 (N.C. 1984); Wells v. Woman's Hosp. Found., 286 So. 2d 439, 442 (La. Ct. 
App. 1974) (applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply where a physician failed 
to remove gauze from a surgical site); Hestbeck v. Hennepin County, 212 N.W.2d 361, 
365-66 (Minn. 1973) (same); Butts v. Watts, 290 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Ky. 1956) (applying 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to a case in which a dentist failed to remove a small 
portion of a tooth he extracted from a patient, and noting that "this court has held that 
leaving a gauze pad within the body of the patient is negligence per se and the fact that 
good surgeons sometimes do so is no excuse, because every man is responsible for the 
legal consequences of his own careless act") (citing BarnetVs Adm V v. Brand, 111 S.W. 
461 (Ky. 1915); Samuels v. Willis, 118 S.W. 339 (Ky. 1909)); Shearin v. Lloyd, 98 
S.E.2d 508, 511 (N.C. 1957) ("It has been established by this Court, and generally, that 
the leaving of such a foreign substance in the patient's body at the conclusion of an 
operation 'is so inconsistent with due care as to raise an inference of negligence.'") 
(quoting Mitchell v. Saunders, 13 S.E.2d 242, 246 (N.C. 1941); and citing Buckner v. 
Wheeldon, 33 S.E.2d 480 (N.C. 1945); Pendergraft v. Royster, 166 S.E. 285 (N.C. 
1932)). 
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specialized knowledge will assist the trier off act to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue." Utah R. Evid. 702; see also John W. Strong, et aL, eds., 
McCormick on Evidence § 13, at 23 (Fifth ed. 1999) (noting that, in order to allow an 
expert witness to testify as to an inference, "the inference must be so distinctively related 
to a science, profession, business, or occupation as to be beyond the ken of lay persons"); 
Glen Weissenberger & James J. Duane, Federal Rules of Evidence: Rules, Legislative 
History, Commentary and Authority § 702.3, at 361 (2002) (noting that, with respect to 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, "the test for the use of expert testimony requires that the 
trier of fact be aided by the expert's testimony"). A layperson can easily understand that a 
surgeon leaving gauze inside a patient's facial tissue is negligent. Therefore, expert 
testimony should not have been required in the case at hand, and the judgment of the 
court below shoulcl be reversed. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN STRIKING THE EXPERT 
TESTIMONY PROFFERED BY MRS. PETE. 
Second, even if expert medical testimony is required in the case at hand, this Court 
should reverse the judgment of the court below because Mrs. Pete properly proffered 
expert medical testimony in her defense. Specifically, the district court's refusal to 
consider the affidavit of Mrs. Pete's treating physician was improper in at least two 
respects: First, a physician who provides medical treatment to a plaintiff for the injuries 
of which she is complaining falls outside the scope of Rule 26(a)(3)(B). And second, 
Mrs. Pete complied with the requirements of Rule 26(a)(3) by identifying her treating 
// 
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physician and by providing medical records, reports, and billing statements from her 
treating physician. 
A. Mrs. Pete Employed Her Treating Physician to Diagnose and Treat Her 
Symptoms, Not to Provide Expert Testimony. 
The district court erred when it treated "hired gun" expert witnesses, who are 
"specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case," in the same manner as 
treating physicians, doctors who are hired by patients concerned with receiving medical 
treatment, not for specific use as a witness in a nonexistent and uncontemplated court 
proceeding. 
Where a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action introduced the affidavit of his 
treating physician in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that the affidavit should be considered. Boice ex rel. Boice v. Marble, 1999 
UT 71, f 12, 982 P.2d 565, 570. Even though the treating physician was not designated 
by name as an expert witness by the plaintiff, the court noted that by indicating that any 
of the plaintiffs treating physicians could be called as expert witnesses, the defendant 
was put on notice that the testimony of the treating physician could be elicited at trial or 
in defense of a motion for summary judgment. Id. 
The affidavit of the treating physician offered by Mrs. Pete should not have been 
excluded because treating physicians are not of the same class of witness as experts 
specially retained to provide testimony at trial. Therefore, because the district court erred 
in striking the affidavit of Mrs. Pete's treating physician, this Court should reverse the 
judgment and order of the district court. 
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B. Mrs. Pete Identified Her Expert Witnesses and Provided Defendant 
With their Reports in Her Initial Disclosures. 
Even if the district court committed no error in holding that a treating physician is 
an expert witness subject to Rule 26(a)(3)(B), that court erred when it concluded that 
Mrs. Pete failed to comply with the requirements of the rule. Rule 26(a)(3) essentially 
requires two things of parties intending to rely on expert testimony: (1) the party must 
identify the witness; and (2) the party must produce a report outlining the basis of the 
expert's opinion. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A)-(B). Because Mrs. Pete satisfied each of 
these requirements in her initial disclosures to the Defendant, the judgment of the court 
below should be reversed. 
First, Mrs. Pete identified her treating physicians to Defendant in her initial 
disclosures. The Rules do not prohibit a party from identifying her expert witnesses 
during her initial disclosures to the opposing party. While the rule requires that these 
expert witness disclosures must "be made within 30 days after the expiration of fact 
discovery," the rules do not prohibit such disclosures from being made at any earlier 
point in litigation. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(C). In the case at hand, Mrs. Pete identified 
her treating physicians in her initial disclosures to Defendant. Therefore, she complied 
with Rule 26(a)(3)(A), and the district court's order striking the expert affidavit and 
judgment must be reversed. 
Second, Mrs. Pete's treating physicians are not required to submit expert reports 
pursuant to Rule 26(a)(3)(B). That requirement only applies to witnesses who are 
"specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case." Utah R. Civ. P. 
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26(a)(3)(B). Although a Defendant must be put on notice as to the bases of a hired gun 
expert through a report, a treating physician keeps notes and records as to his opinions in 
documents contemporaneous to treatment. Therefore, no expert report is required in the 
case at hand. 
One court held, dealing with the federal counterpart to the Utah Rule 26(a)(3), that 
treating physicians are generally exempt from the written report requirement of the rules 
"because the treating physician prepares contemporaneous notes documenting his 
observations, findings and treatment regime." Strozier v. United States Postal Serv., No. 
Civ. A04CV00074MSKCBS, 2005 WL 2141709, *2 (D. Colo. Aug. 19, 2005) (slip 
copy) (citing the Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendments to Rule 26(a)(2)(B) 
("a treating physician . . . can be deposed or called to testify at trial without any 
requirement for a written report); Sprague v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 177 F.R.D. 78, 81 
(D.N.H. 1998) (noting that, under the majority rule, an expert witness report is not 
required from a treating physician testifying as to opinions developed in treatment of a 
patient)). Therefore, Mrs. Pete's treating physician was not required to submit a report 
outlining his expert opinions. 
However, even if Mrs. Pete is required to submit an expert report to Defendant, 
Mrs. Pete satisfied this requirement by forwarding the notes and records kept by her 
treating physicians. Therefore, the district court erred in striking Mrs. Pete's expert 
affidavit. 
Although one Utah court has noted that the affidavit of an expert witness may be 
stricken by the trial court if the expert was not identified by the court-set deadlines 
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pursuant to Rule 16, this case should be distinguished for two reasons. See Arnold v. 
Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1308 (Utah 1993). First, the plaintiff in that case never identified 
the witness to the defendant, and second, the physician involved was not a treating 
physician but was hired specifically to testify at trial. Id. In the case at hand, however, 
Mrs. Pete identified her expert in her initial disclosures to Defendant. Further, as a 
treating physician, Mrs. Pete's expert was not "retained or specially employed to provide 
expert testimony." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B). Therefore, the court below erred in 
striking the affidavit of Mrs. Pete's treating physician, and the order and judgment of the 
court below should be reversed. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
MRS. PETE'S REQUEST FOR A JURY BECAUSE DEFENDANT 
WOULD HAVE SUFFERED NO PREJUDICE. 
Finally, this Court should reverse the refusal of the court below to allow Mrs. Pete 
to present her case to a jury of her peers. Utah law allows a court to grant a motion for 
jury trial, even if the jury was not demanded in a timely manner. Utah R. Civ. P. 39(b); 
see also U.S. Const, amend. VII (preserving the right to jury trial in civil suits). An 
examination of cases ruling on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is proper in the case 
at hand because "the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were fashioned after the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure," Winegar v. Slim Olson, Inc., 252 P.2d 205, 207 (Utah 1953), 
although the decision whether or not to grant a motion for jury trial is discretionary. 
James Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 390 P.2d 127, 128 (Utah 1964). 
One federal case, arising out of the District of Utah, is instructive in the case at 
hand. The court examined case law out of the Tenth Circuit in determining whether to 
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grant a plaintiffs motion for trial by jury when the plaintiff waived its right to a jury trial 
"due to inadvertence." Megadyne Med. Prods, v. Aaron Med. Indus., 170 F.R.D. 28, 28 
(D. Utah 1996). This examination led the court to conclude that (1) "absent strong and 
compelling reasons to the contrary a district court should exercise its discretion under 
Rule 39(b) and grant a jury trial," id. (quoting AMF Turboscope Inc. v. Cunningham, 352 
F.2d 150, 155 (10th Cir. 1965)), and (2) in order to overcome a motion for jury trial, a 
defendant "must show more prejudice beyond a change in the nature of the fact finder." 
Id. (citing Figueroa v. Pratt Hotel Corp., 158 F.R.D. 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)); see also 
Green Const. Co. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 1 F.3d 1005, 1011 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that a defendant claiming that a case was too complex for presentation to a jury 
was not sufficient reason to deny a motion for jury trial). Because the defendant failed to 
show prejudice, or any other "strong and compelling reason," the Megadyne court 
granted the plaintiffs motion for jury trial. Megadyne, 170 F.R.D. at 29. 
In the case at hand, no prejudice, or other "strong and compelling reason" exists 
for the district court's denial of Mrs. Pete's motion for trial by jury. Mrs. Pete filed her 
motion prior to the initiation of any discovery proceedings. In fact, the only actions to 
occur in the case prior to Mrs. Pete's filing of her motion for jury trial, were the filing of 
the complaint, the filing of Defendant's answer, the return of summons, and the voluntary 
dismissal of St. Mark's Hospital. (R. 1-27). Even though approximately five months had 
elapsed from the filing of the complaint to Mrs. Pete's motion for jury trial, the case was 
still in a very early preliminary stage of litigation, and no prejudice would have resulted 
from granting Mrs. Pete her jury trial. 
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Further, Mrs. Pete did not fail to request a jury in a timely manner, pursuant to 
Rule 38, as the result of her inadvertence. Instead, she intended to timely file her jury 
demand within ten days after the last responsive pleading was filed. However, because St. 
Mark's Hospital was able to show sufficient authority, indicating that it could not be held 
liable for Mrs. Pete's injuries, she dismissed St Mark's from the suit. Therefore, her jury 
demand was not timely under Rule 38, although it would have been had St. Mark's not 
been dismissed. Because Mrs. Pete's failure to timely request a jury was not merely the 
result of inadvertence, and because there is no "strong" or "compelling" reason to deny 
Mrs. Pete's request for a jury trial, this Court should reverse the order of the court below 
and should remand this case for trial by jury. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court erred in at least three respects: Pursuant to the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur, Mrs. Pete was not required to submit expert testimony to prove that 
Defendant was negligent in failing to remove gauze that he inserted into Mrs. Pete's 
facial tissue. Further, the expert affidavits Mrs. Pete submitted in support of her case 
should have been considered because she complied with Rule 26(a)(3). Finally, Mrs. Pete 
is entitled to present her evidence to a jury because no prejudice would result from such a 
trial and her failure to file a timely jury demand was not due to mere inadvertence. 
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, Mrs. Pete respectfully requests that the judgment 
and order of the district court be reversed and that this matter be remanded for trial. 
// 
// 
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